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CORRECT DIAGNOSIS; WRONG CURE: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR SUK
Joan C. Williams*
Last week I had a conversation that made me feel like I was back in
the 1980s. A group of us were thinking through how progress could be
made on work-family issues under President Obama, and suddenly it was
déjà vu all over again. One group wanted a full court press for paid
maternity leave. Another advocated the “gender-neutral” approach of
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).1 Divorcing maternity leave
from medical leave, they argued, would make it harder to build a
coalition. The disagreement spiraled deeper, and we ended up recycling
the “special-treatment/equal-treatment” debate, which began when
California passed a maternity leave statute that was challenged as a
violation of Title VII, on the grounds that Title VII requires equal
treatment of men and women.2
Julie Suk’s article, “Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women?,”
argues that U.S. feminists’ insistence on linking maternity leave with
other expensive kinds of leave, notably for a worker’s own heath
problems, has made parental leave harder to enact.3 Her argument is
stronger than she perhaps knows: the FMLA’s equal treatment position
rests on two factual claims that have not withstood the test of time. The
first is that equal treatment is necessary to avoid having employers
discriminate against mothers. This was a plausible claim in the 1980s,
but it no longer is today. Recent studies show that workplace
discrimination against mothers, now called “maternal wall bias,” is the
strongest and most open form of gender discrimination in today’s
* Joan C. Williams is 1066 Foundation Chair, Distinguished Professor of Law, and
the Founding Director of the Center for WorkLife Law at University of California,
Hastings College of the Law. Many thanks to Stephanie Bornstein for her comments on
the draft, to Elyse Grant for help on the footnotes, and to David Pennington for editing.
1. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006).
2. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 274–75 (1987) (“The
question presented is whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, pre-empts a state statute that requires employers to
provide leave and reinstatement to employees disabled by pregnancy.”).
3. Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women?
Rethinking
Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2010).
24
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workplace. The best known study found that mothers are 79% less likely
to be hired, 100% less likely to be promoted, offered an average of
$11,000 less in salary, and held to higher performance and punctuality
standards than women with identical resumes but no children.4 The
claim that the FMLA approach will protect women from discrimination
based on motherhood is not convincing.
Neither is the claim that the FMLA’s approach makes maternity
leave politically more attainable.
A prominent inside-the-Beltway
feminist told me in 2006 that she and other advocates could have gotten
a federal leave law passed a decade before the FMLA if they had been
willing to go with straight maternity leave. A recent historical study of
the FMLA confirms her assessment.5
If Suk correctly diagnoses the flaws in old-fashioned “equaltreatment” feminism, her analysis falters when she discusses family
responsibilities discrimination (FRD).
Suk’s critique reflects the
inaccurate assumption that FRD litigation is based on old-fashioned
equal-treatment feminism. In fact, FRD reflects neither equal-treatment
nor special-treatment assumptions.
Instead, FRD is based on
reconstructive feminism, which bumps the debate up one logical level,
arguing that the gender trouble that creates work-family conflict stems
not from women (from their likeness to men or their difference from
men) but from masculine workplace norms that offer women only two
unequal paths. One choice for women, when masculine workplace
norms define the ideal worker as someone who starts to work in early
adulthood and works, full time and full force, for forty years straight, is
to perform as ideal workers without the flow of family work that supports
male ideal workers.6 Typically this means either remaining childless or
carrying a double work-and-family load. That’s not equality. Nor is the
alternative path: to “opt out” into a marginalized mommy track that
offers accommodations for mothers.
FRD reflects not old-fashioned equal-treatment feminism, but
reconstructive feminism’s strategy of addressing structural inequalities by
naming and contesting masculine norms. Suk’s failure to understand
this stems from her flawed understanding of antidiscrimination law,
which in turns stems from her flawed understanding of gender
stereotyping.
I. SUK’S FLAWED UNDERSTANDING OF STEREOTYPING
The first flaw in Suk’s analysis is her outdated understanding of

4. Shelley J. Correll, Stephen Benard & In Paik, Getting a Job: Is There a
Motherhood Penalty?, 112 Am. J. Soc. 1297, 1316, 1326 (2007).
5. See Ronald D. Elving, Conflict and Compromise: How Congress Makes the Law
23, 32 (1995) (recounting strategic discussions on whether maternity-only leave policies
would be more likely to be enacted than broader leave policies).
6. Joan Williams, Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What To
Do About It 39 (2000).
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gender stereotyping.7 That understanding stems from the Equal
Protection cases of the 1970s. Let’s take Frontiero v. Richardson8 as an
emblematic example. Sharron Frontiero was disadvantaged by a benefits
program that automatically provided enhanced benefits to military
service members’ wives, but required service members’ husbands to
prove that they were, in fact, dependents.9 In other words, Frontiero was
disadvantaged when a stereotype—that men are breadwinners—resulted
in an overgeneralization that did not apply to exceptional women like
her. Let’s call this form of stereotyping “inaccurate assumptions of
universal femininity,” or stereotyping of tomboys—women who have no
intention of conforming to traditionally feminine paths.
Suk assumes that this is what stereotyping is, and, by extension, what
discrimination is:
In these examples, the discrimination occurs in the employer’s
application of gender stereotypes: The paradigmatic case is
one in which the employer presumes that a woman is likely to
underperform at work due to conflicts between her duties at
work and her family responsibilities.
Title VII protects
individual women from being subject to such stereotyped
assumptions when these assumptions do not match the reality
of the individual woman’s job performance. The theory behind
the doctrine is that an individual should not be subject to
generalization based solely on sex, instead, he or she, as an
individual, is entitled to become the exception to that
generalization.10
What is a little disheartening is, as I explained in detail in an article cited
by Suk, that this is an outdated and overly restrictive understanding of
stereotyping.11 Stereotyping not only affects women who are the
exception—breadwinners, for example—but also women who are the
rule—mammas who behave as mammas typically do.12
Take a fictional woman, Mary, who worked full time before she had
children but cut her hours to part time thereafter. When Mary went part
time, her employer decreased her hourly wage rate, on the theory that
women who work part time are less committed and less competent.
That’s stereotyping. An experimental social psychology study found
7. See Suk, supra note 3, at 56 (“If it is ‘undoubtedly true’ that an employer can
adversely treat a worker whose work performance suffers due to childcare responsibilities
without incurring Title VII liability, the antistereotyping doctrine does nothing to ease the
actual conflicts that parents face between work and family.”).
8. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
9. Id. at 680–81. Sharron Frontiero’s husband was in college at the time of the
lawsuit. His veterans’ benefits meant that she could not prove that she contributed more
than one-half of the family income. Id. at 680 n.4.
10. Suk, supra note 3, at 55.
11. See Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit
Bias, 59 Hastings L.J. 1311, 1337–41, 1324 (2008) (discussing at length how Title VII
prohibits gender stereotypes against both “ideal-worker” women and women who follow
traditionally feminine work patterns).
12. See id. at 1338.
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that women who work part time get the worst of both worlds: They are
assumed to be less warm than full time mothers, and less competent than
full time workers.13 This type of stereotyping, too, reflects an inaccurate
assumption. This time the inaccurate assumption is that the desire to
reduce one’s hours reflects reduced competence and commitment.
This is stereotyping, but not of the Sharron Frontiero variety. This
is stereotyping not of tomboys but of femmes. Whereas the stereotyping
of Sharron Frontiero reflected the inaccurate assumption that all women
will follow the traditionally feminine path, the stereotyping of Mary
reflects the inaccurate assumption that women who do follow the
traditionally feminine path are less competent and committed than are
other workers. To translate this into the terminology of feminist theory,
the devaluation of the feminine is gender stereotyping.
II. SUK’S FLAWED UNDERSTANDING OF DISCRIMINATION LAW
Suk’s flawed understanding of stereotyping results in a flawed
understanding of antidiscrimination law.
“The American
antistereotyping approach [in antidiscrimination law],” says Suk,
“attempts to give women the same chance as men to prove their mettle,
but fails miserably by ignoring the gendered barriers to their ability to do
so.”14 Note the assumption, shared by Suk and many others before her,15
that the only cases that can be successfully litigated under Title VII and
other antidiscrimination laws are those involving exceptional women like
Sharron Frontiero. Suk asserts, citing a single case, that Title VII “does
nothing to help workers (often women) who experience difficulty
balancing employment and family responsibilities.”16
Family
responsibilities discrimination (FRD) law does not help women, she
claims, who need workplace flexibility, or “accommodations.”17 As I
describe below, this is a misreading of the law. (I do not embrace
“accommodation” language for reasons I have explained elsewhere—
primarily that to leave the outdated masculine “ideal-worker” norm in
place and require that all workers with family caregiving responsibilities
who cannot meet this norm request “accommodations” re-inscribes
gender inequality.18)

13. Alice H. Eagly & Valerie J. Steffen, Gender Stereotypes, Occupational Roles, and
Beliefs About Part-Time Employees, 10 Psychol. Women Q. 252, 261 (1986).
14. Suk, supra note 3, at 54.
15. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate Treatment: The Ghost of
Martin Marietta, 44 Vill. L. Rev. 337, 338–39 (1999) (“My hypothesis is that there are few of
these mother-discrimination cases [under Title VII] because they are so difficult for
plaintiffs to win.”); see also Williams & Bornstein, supra note 11, at 1316–17 (discussing
various criticisms of using Title VII to redress work-family conflict).
16. Suk, supra note 3, at 56 (discussing Chadwick v. Wellpoint, 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir.
2009)).
17. See id. (“In the face of increased FRD litigation, employers have an incentive to
ignore, rather than engage or accommodate, the work-family conflict, especially as it
affects female employees.”).
18. See, e.g., Williams & Bornstein, supra note 11, at 1321–26 (“[T]he road to
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A. Can Women Sue Under Discrimination Law if They Are Not Ideal
Workers?: The Equal Pay Act
Happily, Suk’s claim that FRD law does not help women unless they
are ideal workers is inaccurate. It is untrue that a woman who decreases
her hours to part time cannot recover under an antidiscrimination
theory. In fact, a Virginia district court held that a woman almost
identical to Mary had stated a claim under the Equal Pay Act in Lovell v.
BBNT Solutions, L.L.C.,19 a case litigated by my former student Ellen
Kyriacou Renaud. Linda Lovell was a materials engineer who reduced
her schedule to thirty hours a week, while her male colleagues worked
full time.20 When BBNT Solutions gave Lovell what women lawyers call
the “haircut,” cutting her pay more than was proportionate, she sued
under the Equal Pay Act (EPA). The jury awarded her $100,000 on her
EPA claim.21 The employer argued that Lovell could not make out a
prima facie case under the EPA because the male employee she chose as
her comparator worked full time, whereas she worked part time. The
“difference in hours alone,” the employer argued, meant that their
positions did not “requir[e] equal effort” as required by the EPA.22 The
court disagreed. The key, said the judge, in determining whether
another employee was a proper comparator, was whether “there was a
difference in duties, not a difference in hours.”23 Unless the employer
could prove that Lovell was doing something different than the male
comparator who was paid a higher wage rate, Lovell had made out a
prima facie case under the EPA.24
B. Can Women Who Are Not Ideal Workers Recover Under Title VII?
Not only do the Lovell facts state a cause of action under the EPA (at
least in some courts), but today, they could also state a cause of action
equality is not to leave the masculine norm in place, and offer individualized
‘accommodations’ to the other half of the population. What makes more sense is to
redesign the norm to reflect both.”); Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the
Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job,
26 Harv. Women’s L.J. 77, 85 (2003) (“What women need, in other words, is not
accommodation but equality. Equality is not achieved when women are offered equal
opportunity to live up to ideals framed around men. True equality requires new norms
that take into account the characteristics—both social and biological—of women.”).
19. 295 F. Supp. 2d 611, 621–22 (E.D. Va. 2003).
20. Id. at 615–16.
21. Id. at 617.
22. Id. at 619.
23. Id. at 621.
24. Id. at 621–22. Other cases have held against plaintiffs who have made similar
arguments. See, e.g., Asher v. Riser Foods, Inc., No. 92-3357, 1993 WL 94305, at *4 (6th
Cir. Mar. 30, 1993) (unpublished) (holding part time and full time workers cannot be
compared under the EPA); LaRocco v. Nalco Chem. Co., No. 96 CV 3980, 1999 WL
199251, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 1999) (same); EEOC v. Altmeyer’s Home Stores, Inc.,
672 F. Supp. 201, 214 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (same). Nonetheless, Lovell highlights the
inaccuracy of Suk’s claim that antidiscrimination law is structurally unable to help women
who do what women usually do (i.e., have children and seek to cut back their working
hours).
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under Title VII.25 To explain why requires a bit of background.
1. Disparate Impact. — Suk, like many before her, assumes that Mary
can only litigate under a disparate impact theory.26 In fact, even ten
years ago in Unbending Gender,27 the only case I discussed at length was
Trezza v. The Hartford, Inc.,28 a disparate treatment case. In the course of
the last decade, I have come to understand why, in terms of fueling
social change, forging a disparate treatment theory is far more important
than settling for a disparate impact theory.
Disparate impact is relevant chiefly in the class action context.
Proving disparate impact typically requires expensive expert testimony,
which is financially more feasible in class cases than individual ones.29
Class actions tend not to be filed on edgy legal theories. Because it is
extremely difficult to get a class certified, and because class action
attorneys have to invest so much into a class case up front, class cases
typically are not brought unless the underlying legal claim is clear-cut.30
Class action lawyers are wary of litigating an edgy new theory because
their business model prohibits them from doing so.
2. Disparate Treatment. — Moreover, only about a dozen class action
firms exist in the United States. Most plaintiffs’ employment lawyers
focus on individual disparate treatment cases. Luckily for law professors,
these lawyers are much more able to litigate a novel legal theory. In fact,
within a year of the publication of Unbending Gender, Steven Eckhaus and
others had begun to litigate issues related to women’s need for different
work schedules under various disparate treatment theories.31
Some lost, but some won. In a case begun before Unbending Gender,
Parker v. Delaware Department of Public Safety, the court held that refusing
25. I have omitted the discussion of Lovell’s actual Title VII claim because that was
litigated as a pay raise claim, rather than on a straight discrimination theory.
26. See Suk, supra note 3, at 113, 164–65 (observing that Seventh Circuit’s rejection
of disparate impact theory of part-time employment is “continuous with prior rejections of
disparate impact challenges to family-unfriendly policies”); see also Int’l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977) (“Claims of disparate treatment
may be distinguished from claims that stress ‘disparate impact.’ The latter involve
employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but
that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by
business necessity.”). The burden of proof for a disparate impact theory is codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006). For further information about the disparate impact
theory, see generally 1 Charles R. Richey, Manual on Employment Discrimination Law
and Civil Rights Actions in the Federal Courts § 1:33 (2009).
27. Williams, supra note 6, at 101–02.
28. No. 98 Civ. 2205(MBM), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1998).
29. Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 911, 982 (2005) (“When a single plaintiff considers challenging [an
employer’s decision], her attorney probably rarely thinks of raising a disparate impact
claim, and when [her attorney does], she may be daunted by the costs of the proof
process and by the procedural barriers to filing a class action.”)
30. Personal Communication with Kelly M. Dermody, Partner, Lieff, Cabraser,
Heimann & Berstein, LLP (Spring 2009) (on file with author).
31. Goldstick v. The Hartford, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 8577(LAK), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15247 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 19, 2002). Unbending Gender was published in November of 1999;
Goldstick was filed in 2000.
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to give a woman a fixed, rather than rotating, work schedule for
childcare reasons when men were given fixed work schedules for other
reasons was disparate treatment.32 In 2004, in Tomaselli v. Upper Pottsgrove
Township, the court held that denying a reduced work schedule to a
woman for childcare reasons while allowing men to set their own
schedules based on personal needs was disparate treatment based on
sex.33 In Latorraca v. Forsythe Technology, Inc., a court held that an
employee had stated a cause of action when her employer reclassified
her part time position to full time while she was on maternity leave, and
replaced her with a childless female, even though two male counterparts
continued on in part time positions.34
These cases illustrate how Title VII can be used to help mothers who
need workplace flexibility, using an old-fashioned comparator approach.
The Center for WorkLife Law, which I direct, runs a hotline for workers
who encounter FRD, and the first question asked in a case involving part
time is whether any male colleague works part time. This is often the
case if the caller works for a large employer.35
If a comparator exists, he probably did not encounter the same
workplace detriments mothers encountered when they reduced their
hours. Probably he was allowed to go part time for what was seen as a
“good” reason—say he had prostate cancer, or was training for the
Olympics. No negative consequences resulted because of an unspoken
sense that his “good reason” for reducing his hours did not reflect a lack
of competence and commitment.
This analysis provides a segue into a discussion of the second way to
litigate workplace flexibility under a disparate treatment theory, which
focuses on the following question: Why, pray tell, did the men’s
decisions to go part time not trigger negative competence assumptions,
while the women’s did? Because of stereotyping. When a woman
reduces her hours in a professional setting, it is nigh invariably because
of motherhood. Going part time makes motherhood salient: Suddenly,
the woman is seen not as a worker, but as a mother (which, again
because of stereotyping, typically are seen as mutually exclusive
categories). This is why shifting to a part time or flex schedule often
triggers maternal wall stereotyping, and the accompanying assumption
that the woman in question is less competent and committed than are
full time employees (or even than she herself was before she went part
time).
That’s devaluation-of-the-feminine stereotyping. Today both under
32. 11 F. Supp. 2d 467, 479–80 (D. Del. 1998).
33. No. 04-2646, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25754, at *11–*12 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2004).
34. No. 06 C 02331, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66242, at *9 (D. Ill. Sept. 7, 2007).
35. The Center for WorkLife Law has further information available on its website at
http://www.worklifelaw.org.
Note that WorkLife Law works with employers and
management-side lawyers, as well as employees and plaintiffs’ lawyers. We also work with
unions and public policyholders as part of our “six stakeholder” model of mobilizing as
many groups as possible to accomplish social and organizational change surrounding
work-family issues.
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Back v. Hastings (which adopted Unbending Gender’s focus on stereotyping
just four years after its publication), and under the EEOC Caregiver
Guidance (which adopted Back’s stereotyping approach), stereotyping
evidence can be used, even in the absence of a comparator, to prove sex
discrimination.36 The Caregiver Guidance offers an example of Emily,
who was held to a higher standard of performance after she used a
flexible work arrangement. The Guidance points out that if the
workplace detriment Emily experienced was led by stereotyping, then it
violates Title VII. This is very important, given that the most common
way women in many professions are penalized today is not by being
denied flexible work arrangements—it is by being penalized for using
them.37
Is this “ideal-worker” discrimination, which Suk treats as of little
importance, or “maternal wall” discrimination, which Suk appears to see
as the “real” problem?38 Actually, there is no difference. When good
jobs are designed around an ideal worker who takes no time off for
childbearing, childrearing, or anything else, jobs have been designed
around men’s bodies and men’s traditional life patterns. When this
occurs, stereotyping arises in everyday workplace interactions. This is
what creates gender bias against mothers.
Following this theory, Back v. Hastings39 (and now the Caregiver
Guidance) allows lawyers to litigate even where no comparator exists, by
using stereotyping evidence in order to meet Title VII’s requirement that
plaintiffs prove that their discriminatory treatment was “because of . . .
sex.”40
That is the complex answer to the charge that antidiscrimination
law only allows recovery for the Sharron Frontieros of this world:
Devaluation-of-the-feminine-type stereotyping can now be litigated as
well.
III. DO NOT FORGET ABOUT RETALIATION!
A simpler point is that Title VII’s prohibition of retaliation also
allows recovery for women who “need accommodation” or—as I prefer
to state it to displace the masculine ideal-worker norm left in place by
accommodation language—women who cannot perform as ideal
36. Back v. Hastings, 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004); EEOC, Enforcement
Guidance: Unlawful Disparate Treatment of Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities
(2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
37. See Jennifer Glass & Valerie Camarigg, Gender, Parenthood, and Job-Family
Compatibility, 98 Am. J. Soc. 131, 148 (1992) (suggesting employers fear that women with
flexible work arrangements will take advantage of them in ways men would not, and
observing that women are more likely to be closely supervised and receive less rest time at
work than men).
38. Suk, supra note 3, at 13–15.
39. 365 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004).
40. Id. at 121; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006) (making it unlawful to
discriminate “because of . . . sex”).
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workers. Feminist theorists consistently overlook the importance of Title
VII’s prohibition of retaliation against workers who exercise their Title
VII rights.41 Litigators are insistent that it is easier to win a retaliation
suit than it is to win on the underlying discrimination suit theory.42
Retaliation theory is powerful because it allows one to contest the
denial or termination of a workplace benefit to which one had no initial
entitlement. For example, under Title VII one can challenge the
rescission of a flexible work arrangement to which the plaintiff had no
initial entitlement. The leading case, Washington v. Illinois Department of
Revenue, provides a good example.43 It involved an administrative
assistant whose alternative work schedule was terminated in retaliation
for her filing of a racial discrimination complaint. The employer
demanded only that she work nine to five. She had been working seven
to three in order to be home in time to be there when her Down’s
Syndrome son got home from school. A very conservative judge (Frank
Easterbrook) in the very conservative Seventh Circuit ignored precedent
holding that a schedule change is not an adverse employment action,44
and instead held that this change of schedule was an adverse
employment action for purposes of Title VII.45 All this is described in a
law review article cited by Suk, so it is a bit mystifying why FRD law
continues to be described as based on old-fashioned equal-treatment
ideology, and only effective in helping ideal-worker women.46
IV. WHO CARES ABOUT IDEAL-WORKER WOMEN?
A different issue is why the law review traffic remains so obsessed
with how to design a three month leave, and so blithely unconcerned
about discrimination against mothers, which (to say it again) is the most
blatant and open form of sex discrimination in today’s workplace.
Surely all feminists can agree that women who do nothing more than try
to be both good mothers and good workers should not get fired or be
otherwise penalized because of open bias? Poor women are subjected to
41. See, e.g., Chamallas, supra note 15 (lacking any reference to retaliation claims).
42. Cf. Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, 588 F.2d 692, 695 (9th Cir. 1978) (“When
an employee reasonably believes that discrimination exists, opposition thereto is
opposition to an employment practice made unlawful by Title VII even if the employee turns
out to be mistaken as to the facts.” (emphasis added) (quoting Hearth v. Metro. Transit
Comm’n, 436 F. Supp. 685, 688–89 (D. Minn. 1977))). In essence, it is easier to establish
a retaliation claim because a plaintiff need not prove the validity of the underlying
discrimination claim. See also Trent v. Valley Elec. Ass’n, 41 F.3d 524, 526 (9th Cir. 1994)
(“[A] plaintiff does not need to prove that the employment practice at issue was in fact
unlawful under Title VII.”).
43. 420 F.3d 658 (7th Cir. 2005).
44. Grube v. Lau Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[The employer’s]
decision to change [employee’s] working hours certainly does not rise to the level of an
adverse employment action. [Employee’s] pay and job title remained the same, and she
suffered no significantly diminished job responsibilities.”).
45. Washington, 420 F.3d at 661–62.
46. Suk, supra note 3, at 157–58. As mentioned, this argument is deconstructed and
refuted in Williams & Bornstein, supra note 11, at 1339–41.
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“drug tests” that are, in fact, pregnancy tests, and are then fired if they
are pregnant.47 Women are fired, and told they can have their jobs back
if they get an abortion.48 Other women call to arrange their return from
maternity leave, and are told they are fired because mothers belong at
home.49 Women are told that mothers will not be hired because women
“lose too many brain cells” when they have children.50 Women are told
they are the top candidates but that they will not be promoted, for ten
years in a row, because they are mothers.51
Hello out there. Does anyone care about these women?
A final word about ideal-worker women who work full time. We
finally have some cross-class data on mothers’ working hours, thanks to
Lisa Guide of the Rockefeller Family Fund. For a report coauthored by
Heather Boushey of the Center for American Progress and myself, titled
“The Three Faces of Work-Family Conflict,” Boushey generated some
important new data on working hours among the poor (families in the
bottom 30% by income), the privileged (families in the top 20% in
which at least one adult has a college degree) and the Missing Middle
(everyone in between). It turns out that, except among low-income
women, a huge majority of mothers work forty or more hours a week.52
Professional-managerial mothers have the highest concentration:
Among two-parent families, both parents work full time in 15% of poor
families, 51% of middle-income families, and 57% of privileged
53
families. The numbers are even higher among single mothers, with
nearly one-third of professional single mothers working fifty or more
hours per week.54 Protecting mothers who work full time is pretty
darned important.
CONCLUSION
I will end by returning to the issue of paid leave. Suk posits a
connection between FRD law and paid leave. Yet the connection she
posits reflects confusion, stemming from the fact that Suk inaccurately
conflates all of stereotyping with one type of stereotyping (stereotyping

47. This and the next example were network calls to WorkLife Law’s Hotline, which
takes calls nationwide from workers who have encountered FRD.
48. Id.; see also Elyse W. Grant, Abortion and the Maternal Wall (forthcoming 2010)
(working paper, on file with author).
49. Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., 480 S.E.2d 504, 504 (Va. 1997).
50. Drebing v. Provo Group, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 2d 811, 823 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
51. James F. McCarty, Woman Wins Suit Over Bias at Kohl’s; Former Worker Says
Pregnancies Prevented Promotion to Manager, Plain Dealer (Cleveland), May 26, 2007, at
A1 (reporting on Lehman v. Kohl’s Dep’t Store, No. CV-06-581501 (Ohio Ct. Common
Pleas 2007)).
52. Joan Williams, Ctr. for WorkLife Law, & Heather Boushey, Ctr. for Am. Progress,
The
Three
Faces
of
Work-Family
Conflict
36
(2010),
available
at
http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/ThreeFacesofWork-FamilyConflict.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 7.
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of tomboys), and further assumes that antidiscrimination law can only
reach this type of stereotyping.
And yet, Suk’s important insight is to sense a connection between
the flourishing of FRD law and the languishing of paid leave. There is a
connection, but it is not the one she posits.
As I said ten years ago: “Our political culture is resistant to
providing public funds or public provision for anything at all. . . . These
are political facts of life. . . . Consequently, it seems foolhardy to link
hopes for feminist transformation to expansion of the government
sphere for the time being.”55 This seems even more true today than it
was then. However, the proposal forwarded in Unbending Gender—to link
the highly unusual seriousness with which Americans take
antidiscrimination principles to their fervent advocacy of family values—
has worked startlingly well. I would be the first to say that this is no
substitute for subsidized childcare, paid maternity leave, daddy days, the
right to request flexibility, mandated vacations, limitations on mandatory
overtime, and the like.
But FRD is far, far superior than all of these in one way (and one
way only). It happened. It came of age during the administration of
George W. Bush, and the EEOC embraced the theory during a period
when the Republicans had a majority on the Commission. It improved
the conditions for parents and other caregivers in a decade in which not
one single thing happened legislatively at the federal level.
Don’t look a gift horse in the mouth.
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